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COMMENTS
allow such an endorsement to preclude further negotiation, as is
permitted in NIL section 47.
By including the term "for deposit" within its definition of
"restrictive" endorsements, the Code settles a serious conflict
which exists under the NIL.6 6 But the Code is silent as to the
status of the much-used endorsement, "Pay any bank or banker"
and therefore fails to settle the controversy as to whether or not
such endorsement is restrictive.6 7
Conclusion
Generally speaking, the pertinent sections of the Code deal-
ing with transfer and negotiation represent improvements over
their counterparts in the NIL. Furthermore, the 1955 amend-
ments to the Code have eliminated two of the greatest objections
to the 1952 draft. The amended Code includes a definition of
"restrictive" endorsement, and it permits a holder to convert a
blank endorsement into a special one. Both provisions were
omitted from the 1952 verson of the Code. There still exists in
the Code, however, a conflict between the definition of "bearer"
in section 1-201 (5) and section 3-204(2). This conflict is non-
existent under the NIL and should be corrected. Until this and
other difficulties are eliminated it is submitted that serious con-
sideration to the adoption of the Code in Louisiana be deferred.
However, in order to preserve the desired uniformity of the Code,
such changes should be made by the Code's draftsmen and not by
Louisiana individually.
Billy H. Hines
The Effect of the Adoption of the Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code on the Negotiable Instruments
Law of Louisiana- Material Alterations
One of the several defenses available to parties to negotiable
instruments under the NIL and the earlier law merchant is to
show that the instrument has been materially altered. Now that
the Uniform Commercial Code has been drafted, it is the pur-
pose of this Comment to analyze the contents of the Code provi-
66. BRITTON, BiLLs AND NoTEs 268 (1943).
67. In First Nat. Bank v. Cross & Napper, 157 So. 636 (La. App. 1934), the
court held that such endorsement was not restrictive and did transfer title. See
Britton, Transfers and Negotiations Under the Negotiable Instruments Law and
Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 TEx. L. REv. 153, 170 (1953).
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sions concerning material alterations and to indicate what
changes adoption of the Code would make in this phase of the
law of negotiable instruments in Louisiana.'
What Constitutes a Material Alteration
UCC section 3-407(1) provides: "Any alteration of an in-
strument is material which changes the contract of any party
thereto in any respect, including any such change in
"(a) the number or relations of the parties; or
'"(b) an incomplete instrument, by completing it otherwise
than as authorized; or
"(c) the writing as signed, by adding to it or by removing
any part of it."
Section 125 of the NIL enumerates certain changes which
constitute material alterations of negotiable instruments.2 Fol-
lowing this enumeration, it states further that "any other change
or addition which alters the effect of the instrument in any
respect, is material alteration." The Code defines a material
alteration to be one "which changes the contract of any party
thereto in any respect." This language is intended as a sub-
stitute for the enumeration of illustrations and the "any other
change" clause of section 125 of the NIL.8 The Code's asserted
comprehensive approach is not entirely achieved, however, be-
cause of the inclusion of three specific kinds of alterations in
the second part of subsection (1). These three alterations are
to be considered material only if they change the contract of one
who signed.4
Because the Code's definition is intended to cover the specific
enumeration of material alterations of NIL section 125, the
NIL provisions will be examined first to determine what altera-
tions encompassed there are included in the new provision. One
1. LA. R.S. 7:1-256 (1950).
2. Material alterations are defined in NIL § 125. It provides:
"Any alteration which changes
"(1) The date;
"(2) The sum payable, either for principal or interest;
"(3) The time or place of payment;
"(4) The number or the relations of the parties;
"(5) The medium or currency in which payment is to be made;
"Or which adds a place of payment where no place of payment is specified,
or any other change or addition which alters the effect of the instrument in any
respect, is material alteration."
3. UCC 3-407, comment 1.
4. Ibid.
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of the material alterations enumerated by the NIL is a change
of the date of issue.5 That this constitutes material alteration
was found so indisputable in one Louisiana case that counsel
for both plaintiff and defendant agreed that changes of the
dates of the notes in dispute constituted material alterations.6
The Code's definition also includes the NIL's second enum-
eration of a material alteration: a change in the "sum payable,
either for principal or interest. '7 In an early Louisiana case8
decided before enactment of the NIL, the court held that a
change of the written amount and the figures payable, in a
blotted and crowded writing over a palpable erasure, was an
alteration of the instrument in a substantial part. In a 1928
case9 which was decided under the NIL, the validity of a note
was held not to be destroyed by the lining out of the figures
showing the amount of the note, and by the inserting above them
of figures showing the balance due. Since there is no change in
the contract of the parties to the instrument under these facts,
the result under the Code should be the same.
A change in "the time or place of payment" 10 would be a
change of the contract of the parties and a material alteration
under the Code. Louisiana courts have held repeatedly that
changes of the due date vitiate the instrument.1 No cases in-
volving changes in the place of payment were found which were
decided under the NIL. In an early Louisiana case,12 where after
5. NIL § 125(1). This is a separate problem from a holder's insertion of the
date in undated paper, which is authorized by NIL § 13: "Where an instrument
expressed to be payable at a fixed period after date is issued undated, or where
the acceptance of an instrument payable after a fixed period after sight is un-
dated, any holder may insert therein the true date qf issue or acceptance, and
the instrument shall be payable accordingly. The insertion of a wrong date does
not avoid the instrument in the hands of a subsequent holder in. due course; but
as to him, the date so inserted is to be regarded as the true date."
6. People's Bank & Trust Co. v. Thibodaux, 172 La. 306, 134 So. 100 (1931).
The decision in the case depended on the legal effect to be given to the bank's
contention that the alteration was made by the bank's agent, without its knowledge
or consent. The bank was held chargeable with legal responsibility for the altera-
tion.
7. NIL § 125(2).
S. Union Bank v. Brewer, 2 La. Ann. 835 (1847).
9. Agricultural Credit Ass'n Inc. v. laccuzzo, 167 La. 230, 119 So. 31 (1928).
10. NIL § 125(3).
11. People's Bank & Trust Co. v. Thibodaux, 172 La. 306, 134 So. 100 (1931)
Isaacs v. Van Hoose, 171 La. 676, 131 So. 145 (1930) ; Simmons v. Green, 138
So. 679 (La. App. 1932). But where there is an alteration in a notation in the
corner of the note reciting the date when the note became due, made before the
note was sent to the maker for signature, the maker's lability is not affected.
A. L. Harrington & Co. v. Barron, 15 La. App. 187, 131 So. 503 (La. App. 1930).
12. Union Bank v. Brewer, 2 La. Ann. 835 (1847).
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the words "payable and negotiable at the office of discount and
deposit of the Union Bank of Louisiana at" had been added (over
an erasure) the word "Avoyelles," the court treated such a
change as a material alteration. In addition to prohibiting
changes, NIL section 125 has a separate provision that an altera-
tion "which adds a place of payment where no place of pay-
ment is specified" is a material alteration. In another Louisiana
case of historical interest,8 an English case 14 was followed and
the addition of a place of payment on the instrument was not
considered material.15 The Code's definition is broad enough
to cover the NIL's specific enumerations regarding both the
change of the time and place of payment and addition of a place
of payment where none is specified.
NIL section 125 (5) provides that a change in the medium of
currency in which payment is to be made is a material alteration.
No Louisiana cases interpreting this provision were found. The
same provision should be considered as incorporated in the
Code's definition of material alterations.
The Code 10 and the NIL 7 have literally the same provision
that a change "in the number or relations of the parties" is a
material alteration. The drafters of the Code state that "spe-
cific mention is made of a change in the number of [sic] rela-
tions of the parties in order to make it clear that any such
change is material only if it changes the contract of one who
has signed."' 8 The Louisiana courts have considered such changes
in several cases.'0 It has been held that erasure of the name of
13. Nugent v. Delhomme, 2 Mart. (O.S.) 307 (La. 1812).
14. Trapp v. Spearman, 3 Esp. N.P.C., 170 Eng. Rep. 537 (1799): "Lord
Kenyon said, that this was not an alteration either in the time of payment, or
in the sum; that to make a bill of exchange void, by reason of an alteration, it
should be in a material part; though it had been formerly holden, that the even
telling up a sum 'on a bill or writing anything upon it, would invalidate it, that
strictness was now exploded; and as the alteration in the present case was not in a
material part, but only pointing out the place where the bill was to be paid, it
was not such an alteration as should invalidate the bill."
15. See Oakey v. Hennen, 18 La. 435 (1841), where the asserted alteration
was the addition of a place of payment, but the court found the evidence insuf-
ficient to support such an allegation and thus did not consider the materiality
question.
16. UCC 8-407(1) (a).17. NIL § 125 (a).
18. UCC 3-407, comment 1.
19. Probably the most poetic consideration of the idea underlying the provi-
sion was that of Justice St. Paul in Alford v. Delatte, 160 La. 712, 715, 107 So.
500, 501 (1926) : "It may be true sometimes, that in borrowing money, whether
for one's self or for another, it is a 'matter of no concern . . . from whom the
money was obtained.' But we venture the opinion that Antonio would not have
gone surety again for his friend Bassanio, if the creditor was once more to be
[Vol. XVI
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the payee and the substitution of another,20 drawing a line
through the name of the payee and interlining the name of
another,2' and scratching through the co-maker's signature with
pen and pencil2 2 are all material alterations.28
Under the Code the completion of an incomplete instrument
in any other than the authorized manner is a material alteration
if it changes the contract of a previous signer.24 This provision
must be read with section 3-11525 on incomplete instruments.26
If the completion is in accordance with the authority given, it
is effective as completed. This problem received separate treat-
ment in NIL sections 14 and 15 rather than being classified as
a material alteration. A separate provision of section 3-40727
includes as material alterations changes in the "writing as
signed, by adding to it or by removing any part of it." This pro-
vision was intended to cover the less artistic "occasional cases
Shylock. And also, where a man has a limited credit with a bank or individual
(whether that limit be arranged for, or result only from his financial status),
he may well be willing to lend his credit with that bank or individual to another
(knowing then full well that the credit thus extended will not exceed such limited
credit as he there has), without at the same time being willing to lend his credit
to that other to any extent the latter may be able to use it."
20. See Alford v. Delatte, 160 La. 712, 107 So. 500 (1926). For two cases
where the asserted defense was substitution of the payee's name but there was
insufficient evidence to support such a holding, see Davis v. Jordan, 185 So. 545
(La. App. 1938); McEachern v. Adcock, 127 So. 99 (La. App. 1930). For a
case decided before the NIL permitting recovery on a note where the payee's
name had been partially erased and another's interlined, see Levois v. Burguieres,
10 La. Ann. 111 (1855). Here, however, Levois (plaintiff-payee on original note)
sued Burguieres (defendant-maker) on a note where V's name had been inter-
lined as payee, and after V had endorsed and waived protest on the note. The
court reasoned that if B (maker) had not consented to the interlineation of V's
name, he should pay the party he promised to pay; if B (maker) had not con-
sented to the interlineation of V's name, he should now pay the party he promised
to pay; if B had consented to the interlineation, the interlined party has con-
sented to payment to L by endorsement and delivery of the note to L.
21. Hammond State Bank v. Strawberry Growers' Ass'n, 162 La. 27, 110 So.
77 (1926).
22. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Freiler, 42 So.2d 296 (La. App. 1949).
23. For general discussions and cases on the problem, see BRANNAN, NEao-
TIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 1212 et seq. (7th ed., Beutel, 1948) ; BsrroN, BiLLs
AND NoTEs 1057 et seq. (1943).
24. UCC 3-407(1) (b).
25. "UCC 3-115. Incomplete Instruments.
"(1) When a paper whose contents at the time of signing show that it is
intended to become an instrument is signed while still incomplete in any neces-
sary respect it cannot be enforced until completed, but when it is completed in ac-
cordance With authority given it is effective as completed.
"(2) If the completion is unauthorized the rules as to material alteration
apply (Section 3-407), even though the paper was not delivered by the maker or
drawer; but the burden of establishing that any completion is unauthorized is on
the party so asserting."
26. UCC 3-407, comment 2.
27. UCC 3-407(1)(c).
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of addition of sticker clauses, scissoring or perforating instru-
ments where the separation is not authorized." 28
Since the Code adopts a general approach by way of defini-
tion of material alterations, there is no need for a "catch-all"
clause similar to that contained in NIL section 125.29 It should
be borne in mind, however, that under the Code if the contract
of the parties is not changed, there is no material alteration.
Examples of changes which have been held to be "immaterial
alterations" in Louisiana cases are a separate and distinct no-
tation attached to a note, which was presumed by the court to
have been made upon execution;8O and the erasure from the
back of a note of part of a list of pledged stock, which was con-
sidered as not being part of the note.8 1
Once it has been determined that an alteration is material,
it then becomes necessary to determine the legal effect to be
given to that alteration. This problem will be considered in the
two divisions treated by the Code: rights of a holder of an altered
instrument who is not a holder in due course, and rights of a
holder in due course of an altered instrument.
Rights of Holder of an Altered Instrument Who Is Not
a Holder in Due Course
UCC section 3-407(2) provides: "As against any person
other than a subsequent holder in due course
"(a) alteration by the holder which is both fraudulent
and material discharges any party whose contract is thereby
changed unless that party assents or is precluded from as-
serting the defense;
"(b) no other alteration discharges any party and the
instrument may be enforced according to its original tenor,
or as to incomplete instruments according to the authority
given."
28. UCC 3-407, comment 1.
29. After the enumeration of specific material alterations, NIL § 125 states
that "any other change or addition which alters the effect of the instrument in
any respect, is material alteration."
30. Exchange Nat. Bank v. Howard-Kenyon Dredging Co., 130 So. 848 (La.
App. 1930). The same notation was held not to modify the unconditional promise
to pay as shown in the body of the note.
31. Alexandria Bank & Trust Co. v. Honeycutt, 161 La. 261, 108 So. 475
(1926).
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-Under NIL section 124, an instrument altered without the
assent of all parties liable thereon is avoided, except as against
a party who has himself made, authorized or assented to the
alteration, and as against subsequent holders. The Code pro-
poses an important change of this provision. No longer will the
instrument be automatically "avoided" by a material alteration;
"the discharge is a personal defense of the party whose contract
is changed by the alteration, and anyone whose contract is not
affected cannot assert it. ' ' 32 It will be remembered at this point
that subsection (1) of the Code's provision defines an altera-
tion as material "which changes the contract of any party
thereto in any respect." For such an alteration to discharge a
party to the instrument, the following requisites are necessary:
(1) the material alteration must be made by "the holder"; (2)
the alteration must be both "material" and "fraudulent"; (3)
the party claiming discharge must not have assented to the
alteration nor otherwise precluded himself from asserting the
defense.
(1) There is some confusion 3 as to the meaning of the re-
quirement that the alteration must be made by "the holder" to
discharge a party to the instrument. No such distinction has
been drawn in Louisiana cases heretofore. Discharges because
of alterations have been held when the holder made the altera-
tion34 and when it could not be determined who altered the in-
strument.3 5 The distinction becomes important because under
the Code an alteration made by a party other than a "holder"
discharges no one, and the instrument may be enforced accord-
ing to its original tenor. Acts of a holder's authorized agent or
employee, or of his confederates, are attributable to the holder.86
Contrasted with this, however, is the fact that "spoilation," that
is, alteration by a stranger, is not intended to affect the rights
32. UCC 3-407, comment 3(c).
33. See Steinheimer, Impact of the Commercial Code on Liability of Parties to
Negotiable Instruments in Michigan, 53 MICH. L. REv. 171, 185 (1954). The
query is put as to whether "holder" means any holder of the instrument or only
to the holder at the time the claim is made and the defense asserted.
34. Isaacs v. Van Hoose, 171 La. 676, 131 So. 845 (1930) ; Simmons v. Green,
138 So. 679 (La. App. 1932).
35. People's Bank & Trust Co. v. Thibodaux, 172 La. 306, 134 So. 100 (1931)
(alterations made during possession by payee bank imputed to payee) ; Commer-
cial Credit Corp. v. Freiler, 42 So.2d 296 (La. App. 1949) (unexplained altera-
tion assumed to have been made by payee's employee and knowledge imputed to
payee).
36. UCC 3-407, comment 3(a).
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of the holder.3 7 The rule relating to "spoilation" by the Code is
a return to the rule of the law merchant after some uncertainty
under NIL section 124.38 It should be observed that in two Lou-
isiana cases8 alterations made during possession of the instru-
ment by the payee were imputed to the payee (without further
proof). It would seem that the same result would obtain under
the Code.
(2) To discharge a person from liability on an instrument,
the alteration under the Code must not only be "material" but
also "fraudulent." Changes made in the honest belief that they
are authorized or out of a benevolent motive would not discharge
a party.40 Long before the enactment of the Louisiana Nego-
tiable Instruments Act, there was case authority for the proposi-
tion that writings erased or interlined will be presumed to be
false or forged if the erasure or interlineation was made in a
substantial part.41 The later cases have dealt little with the
question of intention of the parties making changes, but even
changes in good faith and with honest intent have been held to
vitiate the instrument under the NIL.42 The only significance
given per se to a fraudulent change in the instrument has been
that in the absence of a fraudulent change, the right to recover
on the original consideration remains, notwithstanding the fact
that the note itself is vitiated.4 It would seem, therefore, that
to require proof of fraudulent intent as an essential element of
the defense of alteration would work a change in present Lou-
isiana law.
(3) Even if all the other elements of an alteration sufficient
to discharge a party under the Code are found, if "that party
37. Ibid.
88. See BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 1061 (1943).
39. See note 35 aupra.
40. UCC 3-407, comment 3(b).
41. McMicken v. Beauchamp, 2 La. 290 (1831) ; Union Bank v. Brewer, 2 La.
Ann. 835 (1847).
42. Simmons v. Green, 138 So. 679 (La. App. 1932). The opinion also cites
the facts of Alford v. Delatte, 160 La. 712, 107 So. 500 (1926), to the same ef-
fect, although the latter case does not discuss the matter of intention per se.
43. Simmons v. Green, 138 So. 679 (La. App. 1932). The NIL has no direct
provision concerning recovery on the underlying consideration, and the cases have
been in conflict. See BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 1081 (1943). It would seem
that since the Code restricts discharge to a party whose contract has been
changed by a material and fraudulent alteration by the holder (absent assent or
other precluding considerations on the part of person claiming discharge), that
the party is absolutely discharged. This should follow from the Code's provision
which discharges the party, rather than avoids the instrument under the NIL
approach.
[Vol. XVI
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assents or is precluded from asserting the defense," he is not
discharged. 44 This principle has been recognized in Louisiana 5
and no change should result in present Louisiana law.
Right8 of a Holder in Due Course of an Altered Instrument
UCC section 3-407(3) states: "A subsequent holder in
due course may in all cases enforce the instrument according
to its original tenor, and when an incomplete instrument has
been completed, he may enforce it as completed."
A consideration of the Code's definition of a holder in due
course found in section 3-302 and pertinent supplementary pro-
visions as they affect the present negotiable instruments law of
Louisiana has already been published. 46  Suffice it to say that
several changes are proposed in the determination of this
status.47 Given that the party who seeks to enforce the instru-
ment is a holder in due course, this subsection sets forth his
rights in enforcing an altered instrument.
The Code provides that the "holder in due course" may in all
cases enforce the instrument according to its original tenor.48
This is the Louisiana rule.49 In addition to this provision, sec-
44. "'Or is precluded from asserting the defense' is added in paragraph (a)
to recognize the possibility of an estoppel or other ground barring the defense which
does not rest on assent." UCC 3-407, comment 3(c).
45. Valley Securities Co. v. Brazier, 16 La. App. 1, 132 So. 669 (1931) (de-
fendant maker held estopped to assert alteration as a defense to notes which he
induced plaintiff to take from the payee) ; see BRITroN, BiLLS AND NoTES 1076
(1943).
46. Comment, The Effect of the Adoption of the Proposed Uniform Commer-
cial Code on the Negotiable Instruments Law of Louisiana - Rights of a Holder,
15 LouIsIANA LAW REVIEW 419 (1955).
47. For example, "the Code does not require without qualification, as does
the NIL, that the instrument be complete and regular or that it be taken before
maturity. With regard to completeness and regularity, under the Code the ques-
tion is whether defects on the face of the instrument are such as to put the pur-
chaser on notice of defenses. With regard to maturity, the question is whether
the purchaser has notice that he is taking an overdue instrument, not whether
the instrument is in fact overdue." Id. at 420. See UCC 3-302(l) (c) ; UCC
3-304. Because there are changes in the NIL's definition of "holder in due course"
under the Code, entirely different results could be reached on identical facts, even
though both the NIL and the Code permit the "holder in due course" to enforce
the instrument according to its original tenor. NIL § 124; UCC 3-407(3).
48. UCC 3-407, comment 4, points out that this "provision is merely one form
of the general rule governing the effect of discharge against a holder in due course
(Section 3-602)." UCC 3-602 provides: "No discharge of any party provided by
this Article is effective against a subsequent holder in due course unless he has
notice thereof when he takes the instrument."
49. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Sacks, 152 La. 97, 92 So. 747 (1922).
NIL § 124 provides in part: "But when an instrument has been materially altered
and is in the hands of a holder in due course, not a party to the alteration, he
may enforce payment thereof according to its original tenor."
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tion 3-40650 gives the holder in due course the alternative right
to enforce an instrument as altered where negligence of the
obligor has substantially contributed to .the alteration.5 1 The
second part of subsection (3) provides that "when an incom-
plete instrument has been completed, he [holder in due course]
may enforce it as completed." Under NIL sections 14 and 15,
the rule is different. Under the former, if an incomplete in-
strument is filled up and is negotiated with authority of the
maker to a holder in due course, he may enforce it as if it had
been filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given
and within a reasonable time. 52 Under the latter, however, if
an incomplete instrument is delivered without authority of the
maker and subsequently completed, not even a holder in due
course may enforce it. Under the Code's proposal, the holder in
due course may enforce the completed instrument regardless of
what the maker's position is as to the authority given. This, in
effect, would reverse the rule of NIL section 15. 53
Conclusion
The definition of "material alterations" is essentially the
same under the Code as under the NIL. By introducing addi-
tional factors for discharge, namely, that the material altera-
tions must be made by the holder and must be fraudulent, the
Code's provision may reduce the importance of alteration as a
defense. Adding to the same probable result is the limitation of
the discharge to the party whose contract has been changed,
rather than the "avoidance" of the instrument. The provision
50. "Section 3-406. Negligence Contributing to Alteration or Unauthorized
Signature.
"Any person who by his negligence substantially contributes to a material
alteration of the instrument or to the making of an unauthorized signature is
precluded from asserting the alteration or lack of authority against a holder in
due course or against a drawee or other payor who pays the instrument in good
faith." As amended by Supplement No. 1 to UCC (1955).
51. This provision is not taken from the NIL, but adopts the doctrine of the
celebrated English case of Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253 (1827), which was long a
subject of controversy in both English and American courts. See BRITTON, BILLS
AND NOTES 1064 et seq. (1943). On the facts of Young v. Grote, it was held
that the drawee bank might properly debit the account of the drawer for the
full amount of a check so negligently drawn as to permit its subsequent altera-
tion. This doctrine as reason for permitting recovery by a holder in due course
has been recognized in Louisiana. Isnard v. Torres, 10 La. Ann. 103 (1855). See
Comment, The Effect of the Adoption of the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code
on the Negotiable Instruments Law of Louisiana- The Doctrine of Young v.
Grote, 16 LOUISIANA LAW REvitw 134 (1955).
52. Maloney v. Central Finance Co., 18 La. App. 108, 137 So. 353 (1931)
Sandifer v. Stephens, 8 La. App. 546 (1928).
53. UCC 3-407, comment 4.
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permitting the holder in due course to enforce any completed
instrument may also limit the importance of the defense.
Further, the difference in approach to the effect of altera-
tions indicates that the Code has lessened the importance of the
defense. While the NIL stated that "any other change or addi-
tion which alters the effect of the instrument in any respect"
is a material alteration which results in avoidance of the instru-
ment, the Code provides that "no other alteration discharges any
party" as against any person other than a subsequent holder in
due course. The "finality" of the Code's provision leaves little
room for coverage of unforeseeable types of alterations.
The wisdom of these changes is a matter of speculation. The
comments accompanying the text of section 3-407 state no pur-
pose for the changes that were made, but merely explain what
the changes are. The result, or at least the tendency, of the
changes is to place the holder in a better position to overcome
the defense of material alteration. This undoubtedly will en-
courage more ready acceptance of commercial paper in business
transactions.
John S. White, Jr.
The Effect of the Adoption of the Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code on the Negotiable Instruments
Law of Louisiana-The Impostor Rule
An impostor is one who by impersonation of another induces
a party to draw a negotiable instrument payable to the order of
the impersonated person and to deliver it to him (the impostor).
If the drawer' is deceived and surrenders possession to the im-
postor believing him to be the named payee, the impostor ac-
quires title to the instrument and an endorsement by him in
the name of the impersonated person to a third party is effective.
Thus, when the fraud is discovered, as between the drawer, who
is the first victim, and an endorsee from the impostor, who is
the second victim, the former must bear the loss.2 The Nego-
tiable Instruments Law contains no provision governing the im-
1. Drawer is not used in the limited sense that it refers only to authors'
drafts or checks; it is used in the broad sense to include the maker of a note.
2. For elaboration of this discussion, see BRrToN, BILs AND NOTES § 151(1048).
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